[Devel] Re: [PATCH 5/5] c/r: Add AF_UNIX support (v6)

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Oren Laadan (orenl at librato.com):
> > OL> Does the following bypass security checks for sys_connect() ?

[ on sock_unix_restore()->sock_unix_restore_connected()->sock_unix_join() ]

> > 
> > I don't think so.  We're basically replicating sys_socketpair() here,
> > which does not do a security check, presumably because all you're
> > doing is hooking two sockets together that both belong to you.  That's
> > not to say that we're as safe as that limited operation, but I don't
> > think it's totally clear.  Perhaps someone more confident will
> > comment.
> 
> Yes, please ... Serge ?
> 
> To me it sounds plausible. If we adopt it, then a comment in the
> code is worthwhile.

I'm not sure what Oren means "sounds plausible" or should be adopted.
Using a common helper with sys_connect()?

At the moment you miss out on the security_socket_connect() call.  That
may be not as important for unix sockets, but it does look like selinux +
netlabel can label unix sockets as well.  So I'm not convinced we can
just ignore it, as once we start properly LSM-labeling tasks and
sockets we may need to do that to ensure proper restart under selinux.

The other thing is that some new fancy doohicky might require another
hook in sys_connect, which may or may not be needed for this path.
If coded this way, we may not find out until someone reports some
subtle failure long after the fact.

Still your code is so customized that perhaps an explicit
security_socket_connect() call in your sock_unix_join() may be the
way to go...

-serge
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers at lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers