[Devel] [PATCH rh7] ve/net/core: allow to call setsockopt(SO_RCVBUFFORCE) from Containers

[Konstantin Khorenko]

"nft" util (in CentOS 8 environment) does use setsockopt(SO_RCVBUFFORCE)
unconditionally, so we have to allow it from inside a Container.

At the same time we don't want to allow a Container to set too much
memory for a socket, so just threat SO_RCVBUFFORCE like SO_RCVBUF if
called inside a Container.

Simple rule to test:

  # NFT=/usr/sbin/nft ./run-tests.sh -v -g testcases/nft-f/0011manydefines_0

which fails inside a Container because of not enough rcb buffer because
of failed
  setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUFFORCE, [10561584], 4) = -1
  EPERM (Operation not permitted)

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko at virtuozzo.com>
---
 net/core/sock.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 07ea42f976cf..44e91c8c0f0a 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		goto set_sndbuf;
 
 	case SO_RCVBUF:
+unpriv_rcvbuf:
 		/* Don't error on this BSD doesn't and if you think
 		 * about it this is right. Otherwise apps have to
 		 * play 'guess the biggest size' games. RCVBUF/SNDBUF
@@ -824,11 +825,15 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 		break;
 
 	case SO_RCVBUFFORCE:
-		if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+		if (!ve_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
 			ret = -EPERM;
 			break;
 		}
 
+		/* nft utility uses this sockopt in CentOS 8 env */
+		if (!ve_is_super(get_exec_env()))
+			goto unpriv_rcvbuf;
+
 		/* No negative values (to prevent underflow, as val will be
 		 * multiplied by 2).
 		 */
-- 
2.24.3