[Devel] [PATCH] crypto: vmac - separate tfm and request context
Konstantin Khorenko
khorenko at virtuozzo.com
Mon Apr 20 17:23:02 MSK 2020
already presents in RHEL7.8 kernel and thus in vz7.150.x vzkernel branch.
* Mon Aug 19 2019 Jan Stancek <jstancek at redhat.com> [3.10.0-1078.el7]
- [crypto] vmac - separate tfm and request context (Vladis Dronov) [1733561]
--
Best regards,
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team
On 04/20/2020 01:13 PM, Valeriy Vdovin wrote:
> syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads
> concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG. The bug
> is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request
> state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do,
> but rather stores it all in the tfm context. That's wrong.
>
> Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the
> derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad. Therefore, only the first
> VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest.
>
> Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state
> and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests.
>
> Reproducer for the crash:
>
> #include <linux/if_alg.h>
> #include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> int main()
> {
> int fd;
> struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
> .salg_type = "hash",
> .salg_name = "vmac(aes)",
> };
> char buf[256] = { 0 };
>
> fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
> bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
> setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16);
> fork();
> fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL);
> for (;;)
> write(fd, buf, 256);
> }
>
> The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds
> VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length.
>
> Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3 at syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Fixes: f1939f7c5645 ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support")
> Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers at google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert at gondor.apana.org.au>
>
> (cherry-picked from bb29648102335586e9a66289a1d98a0cb392b6e5 due to
> https://jira.sw.ru/browse/PSBM-103241)
> Signed-off-by: Valeriy.Vdovin <valeriy.vdovin at virtuozzo.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Valeriy Vdovin <valeriy.vdovin at virtuozzo.com>
> ---
> crypto/vmac.c | 408 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
> include/crypto/vmac.h | 63 --------
> 2 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 290 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 include/crypto/vmac.h
>
> diff --git a/crypto/vmac.c b/crypto/vmac.c
> index df76a81..156dd25 100644
> --- a/crypto/vmac.c
> +++ b/crypto/vmac.c
> @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
> /*
> - * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
> + * VMAC: Message Authentication Code using Universal Hashing
> + *
> + * Reference: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-krovetz-vmac-01
> + *
> * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
> + * Copyright (c) 2018, Google Inc.
> *
> * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
> * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
> @@ -16,14 +20,15 @@
> * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
> */
>
> -/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> - * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk at acm.org) and Wei Dai.
> - * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
> - * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
> - * Please send bug reports to the authors.
> - * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
> - * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
> +/*
> + * Derived from:
> + * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk at acm.org) and Wei Dai.
> + * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
> + * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
> + * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
> + */
>
> +#include <asm/unaligned.h>
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/crypto.h>
> @@ -31,10 +36,36 @@
> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> #include <asm/byteorder.h>
> #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
> -#include <crypto/vmac.h>
> #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
>
> /*
> + * User definable settings.
> + */
> +#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64
> +#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */
> +#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
> +#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
> +
> +/* per-transform (per-key) context */
> +struct vmac_tfm_ctx {
> + struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
> + u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
> + u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
> + u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
> +};
> +
> +/* per-request context */
> +struct vmac_desc_ctx {
> + union {
> + u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */
> + __le64 partial_words[VMAC_NHBYTES / 8];
> + };
> + unsigned int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */
> + bool first_block_processed;
> + u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64]; /* running total of L2-hash */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> * Constants and masks
> */
> #define UINT64_C(x) x##ULL
> @@ -318,13 +349,6 @@ static void poly_step_func(u64 *ahi, u64 *alo,
> } while (0)
> #endif
>
> -static void vhash_abort(struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
> -{
> - ctx->polytmp[0] = ctx->polykey[0] ;
> - ctx->polytmp[1] = ctx->polykey[1] ;
> - ctx->first_block_processed = 0;
> -}
> -
> static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
> {
> u64 rh, rl, t, z = 0;
> @@ -364,280 +388,209 @@ static u64 l3hash(u64 p1, u64 p2, u64 k1, u64 k2, u64 len)
> return rl;
> }
>
> -static void vhash_update(const unsigned char *m,
> - unsigned int mbytes, /* Pos multiple of VMAC_NHBYTES */
> - struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
> +/* L1 and L2-hash one or more VMAC_NHBYTES-byte blocks */
> +static void vhash_blocks(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
> + struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx,
> + const __le64 *mptr, unsigned int blocks)
> {
> - u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
> - const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
> - int i;
> - u64 ch, cl;
> - u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
> - u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
> -
> - if (!mbytes)
> - return;
> -
> - BUG_ON(mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES);
> -
> - mptr = (u64 *)m;
> - i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES; /* Must be non-zero */
> -
> - ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
> - cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
> -
> - if (!ctx->first_block_processed) {
> - ctx->first_block_processed = 1;
> + const u64 *kptr = tctx->nhkey;
> + const u64 pkh = tctx->polykey[0];
> + const u64 pkl = tctx->polykey[1];
> + u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
> + u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
> + u64 rh, rl;
> +
> + if (!dctx->first_block_processed) {
> + dctx->first_block_processed = true;
> nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
> rh &= m62;
> ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
> mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
> - i--;
> + blocks--;
> }
>
> - while (i--) {
> + while (blocks--) {
> nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
> rh &= m62;
> poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
> mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
> }
>
> - ctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
> - ctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
> + dctx->polytmp[0] = ch;
> + dctx->polytmp[1] = cl;
> }
>
> -static u64 vhash(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
> - u64 *tagl, struct vmac_ctx *ctx)
> +static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
> + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
> {
> - u64 rh, rl, *mptr;
> - const u64 *kptr = (u64 *)ctx->nhkey;
> - int i, remaining;
> - u64 ch, cl;
> - u64 pkh = ctx->polykey[0];
> - u64 pkl = ctx->polykey[1];
> -
> - mptr = (u64 *)m;
> - i = mbytes / VMAC_NHBYTES;
> - remaining = mbytes % VMAC_NHBYTES;
> -
> - if (ctx->first_block_processed) {
> - ch = ctx->polytmp[0];
> - cl = ctx->polytmp[1];
> - } else if (i) {
> - nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, ch, cl);
> - ch &= m62;
> - ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
> - mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
> - i--;
> - } else if (remaining) {
> - nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), ch, cl);
> - ch &= m62;
> - ADD128(ch, cl, pkh, pkl);
> - mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
> - goto do_l3;
> - } else {/* Empty String */
> - ch = pkh; cl = pkl;
> - goto do_l3;
> - }
> -
> - while (i--) {
> - nh_vmac_nhbytes(mptr, kptr, VMAC_NHBYTES/8, rh, rl);
> - rh &= m62;
> - poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
> - mptr += (VMAC_NHBYTES/sizeof(u64));
> - }
> - if (remaining) {
> - nh_16(mptr, kptr, 2*((remaining+15)/16), rh, rl);
> - rh &= m62;
> - poly_step(ch, cl, pkh, pkl, rh, rl);
> - }
> -
> -do_l3:
> - vhash_abort(ctx);
> - remaining *= 8;
> - return l3hash(ch, cl, ctx->l3key[0], ctx->l3key[1], remaining);
> -}
> + struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
> + __be64 out[2];
> + u8 in[16] = { 0 };
> + unsigned int i;
> + int err;
>
> -static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
> - const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl,
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
> -{
> - u64 *in_n, *out_p;
> - u64 p, h;
> - int i;
> -
> - in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce;
> - out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes;
> -
> - i = n[15] & 1;
> - if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) {
> - in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n);
> - in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8);
> - ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE;
> - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
> - (unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n);
> -
> - ((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i);
> + if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
> + crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> + return -EINVAL;
> }
> - p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i);
> - h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
> - return le64_to_cpu(p + h);
> -}
>
> -static int vmac_set_key(unsigned char user_key[], struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
> -{
> - u64 in[2] = {0}, out[2];
> - unsigned i;
> - int err = 0;
> -
> - err = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->child, user_key, VMAC_KEY_LEN);
> + err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->cipher, key, keylen);
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> /* Fill nh key */
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0x80;
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey)/8; i += 2) {
> - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
> - (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
> + in[0] = 0x80;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->nhkey); i += 2) {
> + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
> + tctx->nhkey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
> + tctx->nhkey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
> + in[15]++;
> }
>
> /* Fill poly key */
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xC0;
> - in[1] = 0;
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey)/8; i += 2) {
> - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
> - (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i] =
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i] =
> - be64_to_cpup(out) & mpoly;
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.polytmp[i+1] =
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.polykey[i+1] =
> - be64_to_cpup(out+1) & mpoly;
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
> + in[0] = 0xC0;
> + in[15] = 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->polykey); i += 2) {
> + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
> + tctx->polykey[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]) & mpoly;
> + tctx->polykey[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]) & mpoly;
> + in[15]++;
> }
>
> /* Fill ip key */
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[0] = 0xE0;
> - in[1] = 0;
> - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key)/8; i += 2) {
> + in[0] = 0xE0;
> + in[15] = 0;
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tctx->l3key); i += 2) {
> do {
> - crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
> - (unsigned char *)out, (unsigned char *)in);
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] = be64_to_cpup(out);
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpup(out+1);
> - ((unsigned char *)in)[15] += 1;
> - } while (ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i] >= p64
> - || ctx->__vmac_ctx.l3key[i+1] >= p64);
> + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, (u8 *)out, in);
> + tctx->l3key[i] = be64_to_cpu(out[0]);
> + tctx->l3key[i+1] = be64_to_cpu(out[1]);
> + in[15]++;
> + } while (tctx->l3key[i] >= p64 || tctx->l3key[i+1] >= p64);
> }
>
> - /* Invalidate nonce/aes cache and reset other elements */
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[0] = (u64)-1; /* Ensure illegal nonce */
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce[1] = (u64)0; /* Ensure illegal nonce */
> - ctx->__vmac_ctx.first_block_processed = 0;
> -
> - return err;
> + return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmac_setkey(struct crypto_shash *parent,
> - const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
> +static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
> {
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
> -
> - if (keylen != VMAC_KEY_LEN) {
> - crypto_shash_set_flags(parent, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> - return -EINVAL;
> - }
> -
> - return vmac_set_key((u8 *)key, ctx);
> -}
> + const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
> + struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
>
> -static int vmac_init(struct shash_desc *pdesc)
> -{
> + dctx->partial_size = 0;
> + dctx->first_block_processed = false;
> + memcpy(dctx->polytmp, tctx->polykey, sizeof(dctx->polytmp));
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *pdesc, const u8 *p,
> - unsigned int len)
> +static int vmac_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *p, unsigned int len)
> {
> - struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
> - int expand;
> - int min;
> -
> - expand = VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size > 0 ?
> - VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size : 0;
> -
> - min = len < expand ? len : expand;
> -
> - memcpy(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, p, min);
> - ctx->partial_size += min;
> -
> - if (len < expand)
> - return 0;
> -
> - vhash_update(ctx->partial, VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
> - ctx->partial_size = 0;
> -
> - len -= expand;
> - p += expand;
> + const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
> + struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> + unsigned int n;
> +
> + if (dctx->partial_size) {
> + n = min(len, VMAC_NHBYTES - dctx->partial_size);
> + memcpy(&dctx->partial[dctx->partial_size], p, n);
> + dctx->partial_size += n;
> + p += n;
> + len -= n;
> + if (dctx->partial_size == VMAC_NHBYTES) {
> + vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, dctx->partial_words, 1);
> + dctx->partial_size = 0;
> + }
> + }
>
> - if (len % VMAC_NHBYTES) {
> - memcpy(ctx->partial, p + len - (len % VMAC_NHBYTES),
> - len % VMAC_NHBYTES);
> - ctx->partial_size = len % VMAC_NHBYTES;
> + if (len >= VMAC_NHBYTES) {
> + n = round_down(len, VMAC_NHBYTES);
> + /* TODO: 'p' may be misaligned here */
> + vhash_blocks(tctx, dctx, (const __le64 *)p, n / VMAC_NHBYTES);
> + p += n;
> + len -= n;
> }
>
> - vhash_update(p, len - len % VMAC_NHBYTES, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
> + if (len) {
> + memcpy(dctx->partial, p, len);
> + dctx->partial_size = len;
> + }
>
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *pdesc, u8 *out)
> +static u64 vhash_final(const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx,
> + struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx)
> {
> - struct crypto_shash *parent = pdesc->tfm;
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_shash_ctx(parent);
> - vmac_t mac;
> - u8 nonce[16] = {};
> -
> - /* vmac() ends up accessing outside the array bounds that
> - * we specify. In appears to access up to the next 2-word
> - * boundary. We'll just be uber cautious and zero the
> - * unwritten bytes in the buffer.
> - */
> - if (ctx->partial_size) {
> - memset(ctx->partial + ctx->partial_size, 0,
> - VMAC_NHBYTES - ctx->partial_size);
> + unsigned int partial = dctx->partial_size;
> + u64 ch = dctx->polytmp[0];
> + u64 cl = dctx->polytmp[1];
> +
> + /* L1 and L2-hash the final block if needed */
> + if (partial) {
> + /* Zero-pad to next 128-bit boundary */
> + unsigned int n = round_up(partial, 16);
> + u64 rh, rl;
> +
> + memset(&dctx->partial[partial], 0, n - partial);
> + nh_16(dctx->partial_words, tctx->nhkey, n / 8, rh, rl);
> + rh &= m62;
> + if (dctx->first_block_processed)
> + poly_step(ch, cl, tctx->polykey[0], tctx->polykey[1],
> + rh, rl);
> + else
> + ADD128(ch, cl, rh, rl);
> }
> - mac = vmac(ctx->partial, ctx->partial_size, nonce, NULL, ctx);
> - memcpy(out, &mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
> - memzero_explicit(&mac, sizeof(vmac_t));
> - memset(&ctx->__vmac_ctx, 0, sizeof(struct vmac_ctx));
> - ctx->partial_size = 0;
> +
> + /* L3-hash the 128-bit output of L2-hash */
> + return l3hash(ch, cl, tctx->l3key[0], tctx->l3key[1], partial * 8);
> +}
> +
> +static int vmac_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> +{
> + const struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
> + struct vmac_desc_ctx *dctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> + static const u8 nonce[16] = {}; /* TODO: this is insecure */
> + union {
> + u8 bytes[16];
> + __be64 pads[2];
> + } block;
> + int index;
> + u64 hash, pad;
> +
> + /* Finish calculating the VHASH of the message */
> + hash = vhash_final(tctx, dctx);
> +
> + /* Generate pseudorandom pad by encrypting the nonce */
> + memcpy(&block, nonce, 16);
> + index = block.bytes[15] & 1;
> + block.bytes[15] &= ~1;
> + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->cipher, block.bytes, block.bytes);
> + pad = be64_to_cpu(block.pads[index]);
> +
> + /* The VMAC is the sum of VHASH and the pseudorandom pad */
> + put_unaligned_le64(hash + pad, out);
> return 0;
> }
>
> static int vmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> {
> - struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
> - struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
> + struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
> struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> + struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> + struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
>
> cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
> if (IS_ERR(cipher))
> return PTR_ERR(cipher);
>
> - ctx->child = cipher;
> + tctx->cipher = cipher;
> return 0;
> }
>
> static void vmac_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> {
> - struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> - crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
> + struct vmac_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> +
> + crypto_free_cipher(tctx->cipher);
> }
>
> static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
> @@ -670,11 +623,12 @@ static int vmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
> inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
> inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
>
> - inst->alg.digestsize = sizeof(vmac_t);
> - inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_ctx_t);
> + inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct vmac_tfm_ctx);
> inst->alg.base.cra_init = vmac_init_tfm;
> inst->alg.base.cra_exit = vmac_exit_tfm;
>
> + inst->alg.descsize = sizeof(struct vmac_desc_ctx);
> + inst->alg.digestsize = VMAC_TAG_LEN / 8;
> inst->alg.init = vmac_init;
> inst->alg.update = vmac_update;
> inst->alg.final = vmac_final;
> diff --git a/include/crypto/vmac.h b/include/crypto/vmac.h
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 6b700c7..0000000
> --- a/include/crypto/vmac.h
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
> -/*
> - * Modified to interface to the Linux kernel
> - * Copyright (c) 2009, Intel Corporation.
> - *
> - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
> - * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
> - * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
> - *
> - * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
> - * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
> - * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
> - * more details.
> - *
> - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with
> - * this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple
> - * Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA.
> - */
> -
> -#ifndef __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
> -#define __CRYPTO_VMAC_H
> -
> -/* --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> - * VMAC and VHASH Implementation by Ted Krovetz (tdk at acm.org) and Wei Dai.
> - * This implementation is herby placed in the public domain.
> - * The authors offers no warranty. Use at your own risk.
> - * Please send bug reports to the authors.
> - * Last modified: 17 APR 08, 1700 PDT
> - * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
> -
> -/*
> - * User definable settings.
> - */
> -#define VMAC_TAG_LEN 64
> -#define VMAC_KEY_SIZE 128/* Must be 128, 192 or 256 */
> -#define VMAC_KEY_LEN (VMAC_KEY_SIZE/8)
> -#define VMAC_NHBYTES 128/* Must 2^i for any 3 < i < 13 Standard = 128*/
> -
> -/*
> - * This implementation uses u32 and u64 as names for unsigned 32-
> - * and 64-bit integer types. These are defined in C99 stdint.h. The
> - * following may need adaptation if you are not running a C99 or
> - * Microsoft C environment.
> - */
> -struct vmac_ctx {
> - u64 nhkey[(VMAC_NHBYTES/8)+2*(VMAC_TAG_LEN/64-1)];
> - u64 polykey[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
> - u64 l3key[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
> - u64 polytmp[2*VMAC_TAG_LEN/64];
> - u64 cached_nonce[2];
> - u64 cached_aes[2];
> - int first_block_processed;
> -};
> -
> -typedef u64 vmac_t;
> -
> -struct vmac_ctx_t {
> - struct crypto_cipher *child;
> - struct vmac_ctx __vmac_ctx;
> - u8 partial[VMAC_NHBYTES]; /* partial block */
> - int partial_size; /* size of the partial block */
> -};
> -
> -#endif /* __CRYPTO_VMAC_H */
>
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