[Devel] [PATCH RHEL7 COMMIT] kvm: mmu: don't set the present bit unconditionally
Konstantin Khorenko
khorenko at virtuozzo.com
Wed May 16 12:50:42 MSK 2018
The commit is pushed to "branch-rh7-3.10.0-693.21.1.vz7.50.x-ovz" and will appear at https://src.openvz.org/scm/ovz/vzkernel.git
after rh7-3.10.0-693.21.1.vz7.47.6
------>
commit 19e5cd42fd649c10244f18920ea3906c47d99c01
Author: Bandan Das <bsd at redhat.com>
Date: Wed May 16 12:50:41 2018 +0300
kvm: mmu: don't set the present bit unconditionally
To support execute only mappings on behalf of L1
hypervisors, we need to teach set_spte() to honor all three of
L1's XWR bits. As a start, add a new variable "shadow_present_mask"
that will be set for non-EPT shadow paging and clear for EPT.
Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini at redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ffb128c89b77b44da18ccf51844a8e750e2c427a)
Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich at virtuozzo.com>
=====================
Patchset description:
EPT fixes and enhancements
Backport of EPT fixes from upstream for
https://jira.sw.ru/browse/PSBM-84046
Bandan Das (3):
kvm: mmu: don't set the present bit unconditionally
kvm: mmu: track read permission explicitly for shadow EPT page tables
kvm: vmx: advertise support for ept execute only
Junaid Shahid (2):
kvm: x86: mmu: Use symbolic constants for EPT Violation Exit
Qualifications
kvm: x86: mmu: Rename EPT_VIOLATION_READ/WRITE/INSTR constants
KarimAllah Ahmed (2):
kvm: Map PFN-type memory regions as writable (if possible)
KVM: x86: Update the exit_qualification access bits while walking an
address
Paolo Bonzini (5):
KVM: nVMX: we support 1GB EPT pages
kvm: x86: MMU support for EPT accessed/dirty bits
kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits
KVM: MMU: return page fault error code from permission_fault
KVM: nVMX: fix EPT permissions as reported in exit qualification
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 13 +++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index d8966018ae60..0d77f961eb83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_uninit_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
- u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask);
+ u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask);
void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index d1f5589dce82..7fa10bf2e2b0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static u64 __read_mostly shadow_user_mask;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_accessed_mask;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_dirty_mask;
static u64 __read_mostly shadow_mmio_mask;
+static u64 __read_mostly shadow_present_mask;
static void mmu_spte_set(u64 *sptep, u64 spte);
static void mmu_free_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -283,13 +284,14 @@ static bool check_mmio_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 spte)
}
void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask,
- u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask)
+ u64 dirty_mask, u64 nx_mask, u64 x_mask, u64 p_mask)
{
shadow_user_mask = user_mask;
shadow_accessed_mask = accessed_mask;
shadow_dirty_mask = dirty_mask;
shadow_nx_mask = nx_mask;
shadow_x_mask = x_mask;
+ shadow_present_mask = p_mask;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes);
@@ -2233,10 +2235,9 @@ static void link_shadow_page(u64 *sptep, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
u64 spte;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK ||
- VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK != PT_WRITABLE_MASK);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK != PT_WRITABLE_MASK);
- spte = __pa(sp->spt) | PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
+ spte = __pa(sp->spt) | shadow_present_mask | PT_WRITABLE_MASK |
shadow_user_mask | shadow_x_mask | shadow_accessed_mask;
mmu_spte_set(sptep, spte);
@@ -2506,13 +2507,13 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool speculative,
bool can_unsync, bool host_writable)
{
- u64 spte;
+ u64 spte = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (set_mmio_spte(vcpu, sptep, gfn, pfn, pte_access))
return 0;
- spte = PT_PRESENT_MASK;
+ spte |= shadow_present_mask;
if (!speculative)
spte |= shadow_accessed_mask;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index f4bb98930a1b..9b64a96f401a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -6305,6 +6305,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
(enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK);
+ 0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK, VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK);
ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
kvm_enable_tdp();
} else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 14dedc4ec207..3b943c782f60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -5982,8 +5982,8 @@ int kvm_arch_init(void *opaque)
kvm_x86_ops = ops;
kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(PT_USER_MASK, PT_ACCESSED_MASK,
- PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0);
-
+ PT_DIRTY_MASK, PT64_NX_MASK, 0,
+ PT_PRESENT_MASK);
kvm_timer_init();
perf_register_guest_info_callbacks(&kvm_guest_cbs);
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