[Devel] Re: [PATCH 1/2] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v10)

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey at schaufler-ca.com):
> 
> --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue at us.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds at tycho.nsa.gov):
> > > On Tue, 2007-11-27 at 10:11 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Quoting Crispin Cowan (crispin at crispincowan.com):
> > > > > Just the name "sys_hijack" makes me concerned.
> > > > > 
> > > > > This post describes a bunch of "what", but doesn't tell us about "why"
> > > > > we would want this. What is it for?
> > > > 
> > > > Please see my response to Casey's email.
> > > > 
> > > > > And I second Casey's concern about careful management of the privilege
> > > > > required to "hijack" a process.
> > > > 
> > > > Absolutely.  We're definately still in RFC territory.
> > > > 
> > > > Note that there are currently several proposed (but no upstream) ways to
> > > > accomplish entering a namespace:
> > > > 
> > > > 	1. bind_ns() is a new pair of syscalls proposed by Cedric.  An
> > > > 	nsproxy is given an integer id.  The id can be used to enter
> > > > 	an nsproxy, basically a straight current->nsproxy = target_nsproxy;
> > > > 
> > > > 	2. I had previously posted a patchset on top of the nsproxy
> > > > 	cgroup which allowed entering a nsproxy through the ns cgroup
> > > > 	interface.
> > > > 
> > > > There are objections to both those patchsets because simply switching a
> > > > task's nsproxy using a syscall or file write in the middle of running a
> > > > binary is quite unsafe.  Eric Biederman had suggested using ptrace or
> > > > something like it to accomplish the goal.
> > > > 
> > > > Just using ptrace is however not safe either.  You are inheriting *all*
> > > > of the target's context, so it shouldn't be difficult for a nefarious
> > > > container/vserver admin to trick the host admin into running something
> > > > which gives the container/vserver admin full access to the host.
> > > 
> > > I don't follow the above - with ptrace, you are controlling a process
> > > already within the container (hence in theory already limited to its
> > > container), and it continues to execute within that container.  What's
> > > the issue there?
> > 
> > Hmm, yeah, I may have overspoken - I'm not good at making up exploits
> > but while I see it possible to confuse the host admin by setting bogus
> > environment, I guess there may not be an actual exploit.
> > 
> > Still after the fork induced through ptrace, we'll have to execute a
> > file out of the hijacked process' namespaces and path (unless we get
> > *really* 'exotic').  With hijack, execution continues under the caller's
> > control, which I do much prefer.
> > 
> > The remaining advantages of hijack over ptrace (beside "using ptrace for
> > that is crufty") are
> > 
> > 	1. not subject to pid wraparound (when doing hijack_cgroup
> > 	   or hijack_ns)
> > 	2. ability to enter a namespace which has no active processes
> > 
> > These also highlight selinux issues.  In the case of hijacking an
> > empty cgroup, there is no security context (because there is no task) so
> > the context of 'current' will be used.  In the case of hijacking a
> > populated cgroup, a task is chosen "at random" to be the hijack source.
> > 
> > So there are two ways to look at deciding which context to use.  Since
> > control continues in the original acting process' context, we might
> > want the child to continue in its context.  However if the process
> > creates any objects in the virtual server, we don't want them
> > mislabeled, so we might want the task in the hijacked task's context.
> 
> I wouldn't be surprised if you've been over this a dozen times
> already, but why hijack an existing process instead of injecting
> a new one with completely specified attributes?

That's really all that hijack does.  current is the one being cloned,
then we switch the namespace pointers over to those of the hijacked
process or cgroup.  We also fix some ids which must be relative to the
task's new namespaces, i.e. pids, uids, etc.  Clone is really the only
time we can sanely do this especially because of the pid namespace
construction.

Or, what do you mean by 'completely specified' attributes?

> That way you don't
> distinguish between an empty cgroup and a propulated one and you're
> not at the mercy of the available hijackees.

You aren't with hijack, because it is just a clone, and you continue
execution as though you'd just cloned.  So mostly only namespace
pointers and some necessarily related resources are switched over.
Open files, stack, environment, they all come from current.

Looking back over copy_hijackable_info(), I suspect capabilities should
be kept from current, not taken from the hijacked task.

I'd like to say the same for the selinux context, but again then I worry
about files in the container being created with the wrong context.

> I know that I would be
> much less uncomfortable with that schenario.

I'm not clear on what your scenario is or why it would be more
comforting.  Can you elaborate?

thanks,
-serge

> > Sigh.  So here's why I thought I'd punt on selinux at least until I had
> > a working selinux-enforced container/vserver  :)
> > 
> > -serge
> > 
> > PS: I'm certainly open to the suggestion that the kernel patch in the
> > end us as crufty as using ptrace.
> > 
> > > > That's where the hijack idea came from.  Yes, I called it hijack to make
> > > > sure alarm bells went off :) bc it's definately still worrisome.  But at
> > > > this point I believe it is the safest solution suggested so far.
> > > 
> > > -- 
> > > Stephen Smalley
> > > National Security Agency
> > > 
> > > -
> > > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
> > linux-security-module" in
> > > the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
> > > More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> > -
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe
> > linux-security-module" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
> > More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> > 
> > 
> > 
> 
> 
> Casey Schaufler
> casey at schaufler-ca.com
_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers at lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers