[CRIU] [PATCH v3] zdtm: test that UNIX socket owner/group don't change

[Pavel Tikhomirov]

On 08/22/2014 01:27 PM, Andrey Vagin wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 11:27:01AM +0400, Pavel Tikhomirov wrote:
>> In container c/r(OVZ) if UNIX socket was created on tmpfs uid and gid
>> might have become corrupted.
> Could you explain why they are corrupted on tmpfs only?
Sorry, that's my mistake, tmpfs is not involved in this bug, i'll 
correct, patch was wrong!
in bug: uid and gid in openvz were set to peer(connected) id's, instead 
of real inode credentials.
>
>> To recreate this case in CRIU, need to mount tmpfs in mount namespace,
>> so it will be explictly restored.
>>
>> run: bash test/zdtm.sh ns/static/sockets00
> We want to execute sockets00 in a current set of namespaces.
>
> ns/* teests are not executed for OpenVZ.

So it was a mistake no mount-namespace needed.

>
>> https://jira.sw.ru/browse/PSBM-28427
> Pls, don't add internal links in CRIU patches.
>
> https://bugzilla.openvz.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2969

OK

>> changes:
>> v2 - cleanup headers, close socket, use err instead fail,
>> print id's on error.
>> v3 - move to sockets00, mount tmpfs and extend explanation.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov at parallels.com>
>> ---
>>   test/zdtm.sh                      |  1 +
>>   test/zdtm/live/static/sockets00.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/test/zdtm.sh b/test/zdtm.sh
>> index 1fd9015..b337b0f 100755
>> --- a/test/zdtm.sh
>> +++ b/test/zdtm.sh
>> @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ mntns_open
>>   mntns_link_remap
>>   mntns_link_ghost
>>   socket-uid-gid
>> +sockets00
>>   "
>>   
>>   source $(readlink -f `dirname $0`/env.sh) || exit 1
>> diff --git a/test/zdtm/live/static/sockets00.c b/test/zdtm/live/static/sockets00.c
>> index 6ff93ab..1e98154 100644
>> --- a/test/zdtm/live/static/sockets00.c
>> +++ b/test/zdtm/live/static/sockets00.c
>> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
>>   #include <sys/wait.h>
>>   #include <sys/un.h>
>>   #include <sys/stat.h>
>> +#include <sys/mount.h>
>>   #include <limits.h>
>>   #include <fcntl.h>
>>   
>> @@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
>>   	char path[PATH_MAX];
>>   	char buf[64];
>>   	char *cwd;
>> +	uid_t uid = 18943;
>> +	gid_t gid = 58467;
>> +	char *tmpfs_dir = "tmpfs";
>>   
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>> @@ -47,7 +51,19 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
>>   		exit(1);
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", cwd, filename);
>> +	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", cwd, tmpfs_dir);
>> +	rmdir(path);
>> +	if(mkdir(path, 0777)) {
>> +		err("mkdir\n");
>> +		exit(1);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	if(mount("none", path, "tmpfs", 0, "mode=0755,uid=99")) {
>> +		err("mount tmpfs\n");
>> +		exit(1);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s/%s", cwd, tmpfs_dir, filename);
>>   	unlink(path);
>>   
>>   	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
>> @@ -74,6 +90,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
>>   		exit(1);
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	ret = chown(path, uid, gid);
>> +	if (ret) {
>> +		err("chown");
>> +		exit(1);
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	ret = listen(ssk_icon[0], 16);
>>   	if (ret) {
>>   		fail("bind\n");
>> @@ -119,6 +141,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
>>   		exit(1);
>>   	}
>>   
>> +	if (st_b.st_uid != uid || st_b.st_gid != gid) {
>> +		err("Owner user or group for %s corrupted, uid=%d, gid=%d",
>> +		    path, st_b.st_uid, st_b.st_gid);
>> +		exit(1);
>> +	}
>> +
>>   	ret = accept(ssk_icon[0], NULL, NULL);
>>   	if (ret < 0) {
>>   		fail("accept\n");
>> -- 
>> 1.9.3
>>